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ABSTRACT
Runtime verification is an effective automated method for
specification-based offline testing and analysis as well as on-
line monitoring of complex systems. The specification lan-
guage is often a variant of regular expressions or a popular
temporal logic, such as Ltl. This paper presents a novel
and efficient parallel algorithm for verifying a more expres-
sive version of Ltl specifications that incorporates counting
semantics, where nested quantifiers can be subject to nu-
merical constraints. Such constraints are useful in evaluat-
ing thresholds (e.g., expected uptime of a web server). The
significance of this extension is that it enables us to reason
about the correctness of a large class of systems, such as web
servers, OS kernels, and network behavior, where properties
are required to be instantiated for parameterized requests,
kernel objects, network nodes, etc. Our algorithm uses the
popular MapReduce architecture to split a program trace
into variable-based clusters at run time. Each cluster is then
mapped to its respective monitor instances, verified, and re-
duced collectively on a multi-core CPU or the GPU. Our
algorithm is fully implemented and we report very encour-
aging experimental results, where the monitoring overhead
is negligible on real-world data sets.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study runtime verification of proper-
ties specified in an extension of linear temporal logic (Ltl)
that supports expression of counting semantics with numer-
ical constraints. Runtime verification (RV) is an automated
specification-based technique, where a monitor evaluates the
correctness of a set of logical properties on a particular ex-
ecution either on the fly (i.e., at run time) or based on
log files. Runtime verification complements exhaustive ap-
proaches such as model checking and theorem proving and
under-approximated methods such as testing. The addition
of counting semantics to properties is of particular inter-
est, as they can express parametric requirements on types
of execution entities (e.g., processes and threads), user- and
kernel-level events and objects (e.g., locks, files, sockets),
web services (e.g., requests and responses), and network traf-
fic. For example, the requirement ‘every open file should
eventually be closed’ specifies a rule for causal and temporal
order of opening and closing individual objects which gener-
alizes to all files. Such properties cannot be expressed using
traditional RV frameworks, where the specification language
is propositional Ltl or regular expressions.
In this paper, we extend the 4-valued semantics of Ltl (i.e,
Ltl4), designed for runtime verification [3] by adding count-
ing semantics with numerical constraints and propose an ef-
ficient parallel algorithm for their verification at run time.
Inspired by the work in [13], the syntax of our language
(denoted Ltl4−C) extends Ltl syntax by the addition of
counting quantifiers. That is, we introduce two quantifiers:
the instance counting quantifier (E) which allows expressing
properties that reason about the number of satisfied or vi-
olated instances, and the percentage counting quantifier (A)
which allows reasoning about the percentage of satisfied or
violated instances out of all instances in a trace. These quan-
tifiers are subscripted with numerical constraints to express
the conditions used to evaluate the count. For example, the
following Ltl4−C formula:
A≥0.95 s : socket(s)⇒ (G receive (s) =⇒ F respond (s))
intends to express the property that ‘at least 95% of open
TCP/UDP sockets must eventually be closed’. also, the
formula:
Ax : user(x)⇒ (E≤3 r : rid(r)⇒ (login ∧ unauthorized))
intends to capture the requirement that ‘for all users, there
exist at most 3 requests of type login that end with an unau-
thorized status’. The semantics of Ltl4−C is defined over
six truth values:
• True (>) denotes that the property is already perma-
nently satisfied.
• False (⊥) denotes that the property is already perma-
nently violated.
• Currently true (>c) denotes that the current execu-
tion satisfies the quantifier constraint of the property,
yet it is possible that an extension violates the con-
straint.
• Currently false (⊥c) denotes that the current execu-
tion violates the quantifier constraint of the property,
yet it is possible that an extension satisfies it.
• Presumably true (>p) denotes that the current ex-
ecution satisfies the inner Ltl property and the quan-
tifier constraint of the property.
• Presumably false (⊥p) denotes that the current ex-
ecution violates the inner Ltl property and the quan-
tifier constraint of the property.
We claim that these truth values provide us with informative
verdicts about the status of different components of proper-
ties (i.e., quantifiers and their numerical constraints as well
as the inner Ltl formula) at run time.
The second contribution of this paper is a divide-and-
conquer-based online monitor generation technique for
Ltl4−C specifications. In fact, Ltl4−C monitors have to
be generated at run time, otherwise, an enormous number
of monitors (in the size of cross-product of domains of all
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variables) has to be created statically, which is clearly im-
practical. Our technique first synthesizes an Ltl4 monitor
for the inner Ltl property of Ltl4−C properties pre-compile
time using the technique in [3]. Then, based upon the values
of variables observed at run time, submonitors are generated
and merged to compute the current truth value of a property
for the current program trace.
Our third contribution is an algorithm that implements
the above approach for verification of Ltl4−C properties at
run time. This algorithm enjoys two levels of parallelism:
the monitor (1) works in parallel with the program under
inspection, and (2) evaluates properties in a parallel fashion
as well. While the former ensures that the runtime monitor
does not intervene with the normal operation of the pro-
gram under inspection, the latter attempts to maximize the
throughput of the monitor. The algorithm utilizes the pop-
ular MapReduce technique to (1) spawn submonitors that
aim at evaluating subformulas using partial quantifier elim-
ination, and (2) merge partial evaluations to compute the
current truth value of properties.
Our parallel algorithm for verification of Ltl4−C proper-
ties is fully implemented on multi-core CPU and GPU tech-
nologies. We report rigorous experimental results by con-
ducting three real-world independent case studies. The first
case study is concerned with monitoring HTTP requests and
responses on an Apache Web Server. The second case study
attempts to monitor users uploading maximum chunk pack-
ets repeatedly to a personal cloud storage service based on a
dataset for profiling DropBox traffic. The third case study
monitors a network proxy cache to reduce the bandwidth
usage of online video services, based on a YouTube request
dataset. We present performance results comparing single-
core CPU, multi-core CPU, and GPU implementations. Our
results show that our GPU-based implementation provides
an average speed up of 7x when compared to single-core
CPU, and 1.75x when compared to multi-core CPU. The
CPU utilization of the GPU-based implementation is neg-
ligible compared to multi-core CPU, freeing up the system
to perform more computation. Thus, the GPU-based imple-
mentation manages to provide competitive speedup while
maintaining a low CPU utilization, which are two goals that
the CPU cannot achieve at the same time. Put it another
way, the GPU-based implementation incurs minimal moni-
toring costs while maintaining a high throughput.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the syntax and semantics of Ltl4−C. In Section 3,
we explain our online monitoring approach, while Section 4
presents our parallelization technique based on MapReduce.
Experimental results are presented in Section 5. Related
work is discussed in Section 6. Finally, we make concluding
remarks and discuss future work in Section 7.
2. LTL WITH COUNTING SEMANTICS
To introduce our logic, we first define a set of basic con-
cepts.
Definition 1 (Predicate). Let V = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
be a set of variables with (possibly infinite) domains
D1,D2, . . . ,Dn, respectively. A predicate p is a binary-valued
function on the domains of variables in V such that
p : D1 ×D2 × · · · × Dn → {true, false} 
The arity of a predicate is the number of variables it accepts.
A predicate is uninterpreted if the domain of variables are
not known concrete sets. For instance, p(x1, x2) is an unin-
terpreted predicate, yet we can interpret it as (for instance)
a binary function that checks whether or not x1 is less than
x2 over natural numbers.
Let UP be a finite set of uninterpreted predicates, and let
Σ = 2UP be the power set of UP . We call each element of
Σ an event.
Definition 2 (Trace). A trace w = w0w1 · · · is a
finite or infinite sequence of events; i.e, wi ∈ Σ, for all
i ≥ 0. 
We denote the set of all infinite traces by Σω and the set
of all finite traces by Σ∗. A program trace is a sequence of
events, where each event consists of interpreted predicates
only. For instance, the following trace is a program trace:
w = {open(1), r, anony)} {open(2), rw, user(5)} · · ·
where open and user are unary predicates and r, anony, and
rw are 0-arity predicates. Predicate open is interpreted as
opening a file, r is interpreted as read-only permissions, anony
is interpreted as an anonymous user, and so on.
2.1 Syntax of LTL4-C
Ltl4−C extends Ltl4 with two counting quantifiers: the
instance counting quantifier (E) and the percentage counting
quantifier (A). The semantics of these quantifiers are intro-
duced in subsection 2.4. The syntax of Ltl4−C is defined
as follows:
Definition 3 (Ltl4−C Syntax). Ltl4−C formulas
are defined using the following grammar:
ϕ ::=A∼k x : p(x)⇒ ϕ | E∼l x : p(x)⇒ ϕ | ψ
ψ ::=> | p (x1 · · ·xn) | ¬ψ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 |
Xψ | ψ1 Uψ2
where A is the percentage counting quantifier, E is the in-
stance counting quantifier, x, x1 · · ·xn are variables with
possibly infinite domains D,D1, · · · Dn, ∼∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=},
k :R ∈ [0, 1], l ∈ Z+, X is the next, and U is the until tem-
poral operators. 
If we omit the numerical constraint in A∼k (respectively,
E∼l), we mean A=1 (respectively, E≥1). The syntax of
Ltl4−C forces constructing formulas, where a string of count-
ing quantifiers is followed by a quantifier-free formula. We
emphasize that A and E do not necessarily resemble stan-
dard first-order quantifiers ∀ and ∃. In fact, as we will ex-
plain ¬A and E are not generally equivalent.
Consider Ltl4−C property ϕ = Ax : p(x) ⇒ ψ, where
the domain of x is D. This property denotes that for any
possible valuation of the variable x ([x := v]), if p(v) holds,
then ψ should hold. If p(v) does not hold, then p(v) ⇒ ψ
trivially evaluates to true. This effectively means that the
quantifier Ax is in fact applied only over the following sub-
domain:
{v ∈ D | p(v)} ⊆ D
To give an intuition, consider the scenarios where file man-
agement anomalies can cause serious problems at run time
(e.g., in NASA’s Spirit Rover on Mars in 2004). For exam-
ple, the following Ltl4−C property expresses “at least half
of the files that a process has previously opened must be
closed”:
ϕ1 = A≥50% f : intrace(f)⇒ (opened(f) U close(f)) (1)
where intrace denotes the fact that the concrete file appeared
in any event in the trace.
2.2 4-Valued LTL [3]
First, we note that the syntax of Ltl4 can be easily ob-
tained from Definition 3 by (1) removing the counting quan-
tifier rules and (2) reducing the arity of predicates to 0 (i.e.,
predicates become atomic propositions).
2
2.2.1 FLTL
To introduce Ltl4 semantics, we first introduce Finite
Ltl. Finite Ltl (Fltl) [14] allows us to reason about finite
traces for verifying properties at run time. The semantics of
Fltl is based on the truth values B2 = {>,⊥}.
Definition 4 (Fltl semantics). Let ϕ and ψ be Ltl
properties, and u = u0u1 · · ·un−1 be a finite trace.
[u |=F Xϕ] =
{
[u1 |=F ϕ] if u1 6= 
⊥ otherwise
[u |=F ϕUψ] =

> ∃k ∈ [0, n− 1] : [uk |=F ψ] = > ∧
∀l ∈ [0, k) : [ul |=F ϕ] = >
⊥ otherwise
where  is the empty trace. The semantics of Fltl for
atomic propositions and Boolean combinations are identical
to that of Ltl. 
Similar to standard Ltl, Fp ≡ >U p and Gp ≡ ¬F¬p.
2.2.2 LTL4 Semantics
Ltl4 is designed for runtime verification by producing
more informative verdicts than Fltl. The semantics of Ltl4
is defined based on values B4 = {>,>p,⊥p,⊥} (true, pre-
sumably true, presumably false, and false respectively). The
semantics of Ltl4 is defined based on the semantics Ltl and
Fltl.
Definition 5 (Ltl4 semantics). Let ϕ be an Ltl4
property and u be a finite prefix of a trace.
[u |=4 ϕ] =

> ∀v ∈ Σω : uv |= ϕ
⊥ ∀v ∈ Σω : uv 6|= ϕ
>p [u |=F ϕ] ∧ ∃v ∈ Σω : uv 6|= ϕ
⊥p [u 6|=F ϕ] ∧ ∃v ∈ Σω : uv |= ϕ 
In this definition, |= denotes the satisfaction relation defined
by standard Ltl semantics over infinite traces. Thus, an
Ltl4 property evaluates to > with respect to a finite trace u,
if the property remains permanently satisfied, meaning that
for all possible infinite continuations of the trace, the prop-
erty will always be satisfied in Ltl. Likewise, a valuation
of ⊥ means that the property will be permanently violated.
If the property evaluates to >p, this denotes that currently
the property is satisfied yet there exists a continuation that
could violate it. Finally, value ⊥p denotes that currently
the property is violated yet there exists a continuation that
could satisfy it.
2.2.3 LTL4 Monitors
In [3], the authors introduce a method of synthesizing a
monitor, as a deterministic finite state machine (FSM), for
an Ltl4 property.
Definition 6 (Ltl4 Monitor). Let ϕ be an Ltl4 for-
mula over Σ. The monitor Mϕ of ϕ is the unique FSM
(Σ, Q, q0, δ, λ), where Q is a set of states, q0 is the ini-
tial state, δ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is the transition relation, and
λ : Q→ B4 is a function such that:
[u |=4 ϕ] = λ(δ(q0, u)). 
Thus, given an Ltl4 property ϕ and a finite trace u, moni-
torMϕ is capable of producing a truth value in B4, which is
equal to [u |=4 ϕ]. For example, Figure 1 shows the monitor
for property ϕ = Ga ∨ (bU c). Observe that a monitor
>p ?p >p ?p
> ?
> ?
a ¬a b ¬b c ¬c
¬a ^ b ¬a ^ ¬b ^ ¬c
a ¬a b ¬b c ¬c
¬a ^ b ¬b ^ ¬c
a a b b c ¬c
a b ¬a ^ ¬b ^ ¬c
a ¬a b ¬b c ¬c
¬a ^ b ¬a ^ ¬b ^ ¬c
a ¬a b ¬b c ¬c
a ^ b ¬a ^ ¬b ^ ¬c
a ¬a b ¬b c ¬c
¬a ^ b ¬a ^ ¬b ^ ¬c
true
true
Figure 1: Ltl4 monitor for property ϕ = Ga ∨ (bU c).
has two trap states (only an outgoing self loop), which map
to truth values > and ⊥. They are trap states since these
truth values imply permanent satisfaction (respectively, vi-
olation). Otherwise, states labeled by >p and ⊥p can have
outgoing transitions to other states.
2.3 Truth Values of LTL4-C
The objective of Ltl4−C is to verify the correctness of
quantified properties at run time with respect to finite pro-
gram traces. Such verification attempts to produce a sound
verdict regardless of future continuations.
We incorporate six truth values to define the semantics of
Ltl4−C: B6 = {>,⊥,>c,⊥c,>p,⊥p}; true, false, currently
true, currently false, presumably true, presumably false, re-
spectively. The values in B6 form a lattice ordered as follows:
⊥ < ⊥c < ⊥p < >p < >c < >. Given a finite trace u and an
Ltl4−C property ϕ, the informal description of evaluation
of u with respect to ϕ is as follows:
• True (>) denotes that any infinite extension of u sat-
isfies ϕ.
• False (⊥) denotes that any infinite extension of u vi-
olates ϕ.
• Currently true (>c) denotes that currently u satis-
fies the counting quantifier constraint of ϕ, yet it is
possible that a suffix of u violates the constraint. For
instance, the valuation of Property 1 (i.e., ϕ1) is >c, if
in a trace u, currently 50% of files previously opened
are closed. This is because (1) the inner Ltl property
is permanently satisfied for at least 50% of files previ-
ously opened, and (2) it is possible for a trace continu-
ation to change this percentage to less than 50% in the
future (a trace in which enough new files are opened
and not closed).
• Currently false (⊥c) denotes that currently u vio-
lates the quantifier constraint of ϕ, yet it is possible
that a suffix of u satisfies the constraint. For instance,
the valuation of Property 1 (i.e., ϕ1) in a finite trace
u is ⊥c, if the number of files that were not success-
fully opened is currently greater than 50%. This could
happen in the scenario where opening a file fails, pos-
sibly due to lack of permissions. Analogous to >c, the
property is evaluated to ⊥c because (1) the inner Ltl
property is permanently satisfied for less than 50% of
files in the program trace, and (2) it is possible for a
trace continuation to change this percentage to at least
50% in the future.
Now let us consider modifying the property to support
multiple open and close operations on the same file. For
this purpose, we reformulate the property as follows:
ϕ2 = A≥50% f : intrace(f)⇒ (G (opened(f) U close(f))) (2)
• Presumably true (>p) extends the definition of pre-
sumably true in Ltl4 [4], where >p denotes that u sat-
3
isfies the inner Ltl property and the counting quan-
tifier constraint in ϕ, if the program terminates after
execution of u. For example, Property 2 (i.e., ϕ2) eval-
uates to >p, if at least 50% of the files in the program
trace are closed. Closed files presumably satisfy the
property, since they satisfy the G operator thus far,
yet can potentially violate it if the file is opened a
subsequent time without being closed. Note that this
property can never evaluate to >c, since no finite trace
prefix can permanently satisfy the inner Ltl property.
However, if the inner property can be permanently sat-
isfied (>) and presumably satisfied (>p), then the en-
tire Ltl4−C property can potentially evaluate to >c
if the numerical condition of the quantifier is satisfied.
A property can evaluate to >p only if the conditions
for >c are not met, since >c is higher up the partial
order of B6.
• Presumably false (⊥p) extends the definition of pre-
sumably false in Ltl4 [4], which denotes that u presum-
ably violates the quantifier constraint in ϕ. According
to the Property 2, this scenario will occur when the
number of files that are either closed or opened and
not yet closed is at least 50% of all files in the trace.
Opened files presumably violate the inner property,
since closing the file is required but has not yet oc-
curred. This condition should not conflict with >p or
>c, since they precede ⊥p in the partial order of B6
and thus ⊥p only occurs if the conditions for >p and
>c do not hold.
2.4 Semantics of LTL4-C
An Ltl4−C property essentially defines a set of traces,
where each traces is a sequences of events (i.e., sets of unin-
terpreted predicates). We define the semantics of Ltl4−C
with respect to finite traces and present a method of utiliz-
ing these semantics for runtime verification. In the context
of runtime verification, the objective is to ensure that a pro-
gram trace (i.e., a sequence of sets of interpreted predicates)
is in the set of traces that the property defines, given the in-
terpretations of the property predicates within the program
trace.
To introduce the semantics of Ltl4−C, we examine count-
ing quantifiers further. Since the syntax of Ltl4−C allows
nesting of counting quantifiers, a canonical form of proper-
ties is as follows:
ϕ = Qϕ ψ (3)
where ψ is an Ltl property and Qϕ is a string of counting
quantifiers
Qϕ = Q0Q1 · · · Qn−1 (4)
such that each Qi = 〈Qi,∼i, ci, xi, pi〉, 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1, is a tu-
ple encapsulating the counting quantifier information. That
is, Qi ∈ {A,E}, ∼i∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=}, ci is the constraint
constant, xi is the bound variable, and pi is the predicate
within the quantifier (see Definition 3).
We presents semantics of Ltl4−C in a stepwise manner:
1. Variable valuation. First, we demonstrate how vari-
able valuations are extracted from the trace and used
to substitute variables in the formula.
2. Canonical variable valuations. Next, we demon-
strate how to build a canonical structure of the variable
valuations provided in Step 1. This canonical structure
mirrors the canonical structure of Ltl4−C properties.
3. Valuation of property instances. A property in-
stance is a unique substitution of variables in the prop-
erty with values from their domains. This step demon-
strate how to evaluate property instances.
4. Applying quantifier numerical constraints. This
step demonstrates how to evaluate counting quantifiers
by applying their numerical constraints on the valua-
tion of a set of property instances from Step 3. The
set of property instances is retrieved with respect to
the canonical structure defined in Step 2.
5. Inductive semantics. Using the canonical structure
in Step 2, and valuation of counting quantifiers in Step
4, we define semantics that begin at the outermost
counting quantifier of an Ltl4−C property and evalu-
ate quantifiers recursively inwards.
2.4.1 Variable Valuation
We define a vector Dϕ with respect to a property ϕ as
follows:
Dϕ = 〈d0, d1, · · · , dn−1〉
where n = |Qϕ| and di, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, is a value for variable
xi. We denote the first m components of the vector Dϕ
(i.e., 〈d0, d1, · · · , dm−1〉) by Dϕ|m. We refer to Dϕ as a
value vector and to Dϕ|m as a partial value vector.
A property instances ϕˆ(Dϕ|m) is obtained by replacing
every occurrence of the variables x0 · · ·xm−1 in ϕ with the
values d0 · · · dm−1, respectively. Thus, ϕˆ(Dϕ|m) is free of
quantifiers of index less than m, yet remains quantified over
variables xm · · ·xn−1. For instance, for the following prop-
erty
ϕ = A>c1 x : px(x)⇒ (A<c2 y : py(y)⇒ G q(x, y))
and value vector Dϕ = 〈1, 2〉 (i.e., the vector of values for
variables x and y, respectively), ϕˆ(Dϕ) will be
ϕˆ(〈1, 2〉) = px(1)⇒ (py(2)⇒ G q(1, 2))
We now define the set Dϕ,u as the set of all value vectors
with respect to a property ϕ = Qϕ ψ and a finite trace
u = u0u1 · · ·uk:
Dϕ,u = {Dϕ | ∃j ∈ [0, k] : ∀i ∈ [0, n− 1] : pi(di) ∈ uj} (5)
where n = |Qϕ|.
2.4.2 Canonical Variable Valuations
An Ltl4−C property follows a canonical structure, in
which every counting quantifier Qi has a parent quantifier
Qi−1, except for Q0 which is the root counting quantifier.
A counting quantifier Qi is applied over all valuations of
its variable xi given a unique valuation of its predecessor
variables x0, · · · , xi−1. Hence, we define function P which
takes as input a partial value vector Dϕ|m, and returns all
partial value vectors in Dϕ,u of length m+ 1, such that the
first m elements of these vectors is the same as Dϕ|m. In
this context, we refer to Dϕ|m as a parent vector and all
the returned vectors as child vectors. Similarly, a property
instance can have a parent; for instance, ϕˆ(Dϕ|m) is the
parent of ϕˆ(Dϕ|m+1).
P(ϕ, u,Dϕ|m) =
{
D′ϕ|m+1
∣∣∣∣ D′ϕ ∈ Dϕ,u ∧ D′ϕ|m = Dϕ|m}
Following the example above, assume there are two value
vectors: 〈1, 2〉 and 〈1, 3〉. In this case,
P(ϕ, u, 〈1〉) = {〈1, 2〉, 〈1, 3〉}
4
2.4.3 Valuation of Property Instances
As per the definition of Dϕ,u, every value vector Dϕ =
〈d0 · · · dn−1〉 in Dϕ,u contains values for which the predicates
pi(di) hold in some trace event uj . For simplicity, we denote
this as a value vector in a trace event uj . These value vectors
can possibly be in multiple and interleaved events in the
trace. Thus, we define a trace uDϕ = u
Dϕ
0 u
Dϕ
1 · · ·uDϕl as a
subsequence of the trace u such that the value vector Dϕ is
in every event:
∀ j ∈ [0, l] : ∀ i ∈ [0, n− 1] : pi(di) ∈ uDϕj
For any property instance ϕˆ(Dϕ), we wish to evaluate
[uDϕ |=6 ϕˆ(Dϕ)] (read as valuation of ϕˆ(Dϕ) with respect
to uDϕ for Ltl4−C), since any other event in trace u is not
of interest to ϕˆ(Dϕ).
By leveraging uDϕ , we define function B as follows:
B(ϕ, u,Dϕ|m, b) =
D′ϕ|m+1 ∈ P(ϕ, u,Dϕ|m) |
[uD
′
ϕ|m+1 |=6 ϕˆ(D′ϕ|m+1)] = b iff m < |Qϕ| − 1
D′ϕ|m+1 ∈ P(ϕ, u,Dϕ|m) |
[uD
′
ϕ|m+1 |=4 ϕˆ(D′ϕ|m+1)] = b iff m = |Qϕ| − 1
where b is a truth value in B6. Function B can be imple-
mented in a straightforward manner, where it iterates over
all its children value vectors D′ϕ|m+1 which are retrieved us-
ing P. For every child vector, the function checks whether
ϕˆ(D′ϕ|m+1) evaluates to b with respect to the trace subse-
quence uD
′
ϕ|m+1 .
To clarify B, let us refer to our example earlier. Let a
program trace u be as follows:
u = {px(1), py(2), · · · }, {px(1), py(3), · · · }, {px(1), py(2), · · · }
With respect to this trace, P(ϕ, u, 〈1〉) = {〈1, 2〉, 〈1, 3〉}. As
per the definition of uDϕ , u〈1,2〉 = u0u2, and u〈1,3〉 = u1.
Thus, B(ϕ, u, 〈1〉, b) checks the following:
[u〈1,2〉 |=4 px(1)⇒ (py(2)⇒ G q(1, 2))] = b
[u〈1,3〉 |=4 px(1)⇒ (py(3)⇒ G q(1, 3))] = b
The definition of uDϕ implies that pi(di) ∈ uDϕj for all j.
Thus, we can simplify the property by omitting the p pred-
icates since they hold by definition:
[u〈1,2〉 |=4 G q(1, 2)] = b
[u〈1,3〉 |=4 G q(1, 3)] = b
For instance, if only [u〈1,2〉 |=4 G q(1, 2)] = b holds, then
B(ϕ, u, 〈1〉, b) = {〈1, 2〉}
As can be seen in the example, the property instances that
are evaluated are Ltl4 properties. This is because the input
to B is Dϕ|1 = Dϕ||Qϕ|−1, which represents the inner most
quantifier.
2.4.4 Applying Quantifier Numerical Constraints
Finally, numerical constraints should be incorporated in
the semantics. We define function S as follows:
S(ϕ, u,Dϕ|m, B) =

∣∣∣∣ ⋃
b∈B
B(ϕ, u,Dϕ|m, b)
∣∣∣∣ ∼i
ci × |{P(ϕ, u,Dϕ|m)}| iff Qm = A∣∣∣∣ ⋃
b∈B
B(ϕ, u,Dϕ|m, b)
∣∣∣∣ ∼i ci iff Qm = E
(6)
where B ⊆ B6 is a set of truth values. This function returns
whether a counting quantifier constraint is satisfied or not
based on any of the truth values b ∈ B. Observe that, for
percentage counting quantifiers, the constraint value denotes
the percentage of property instances that evaluate to b. For
instance counting quantifiers, the constraint value denotes
the number of property instances that evaluate to b. For
instance, consider Property 7 which is read as: for all users,
there exists at most 3 requests of type login that end with
an unauthorized status. For such a property, if 4 or more
unauthorized login attempts are detected for the same user,
the property is permanently violated.
2.4.5 Inductive Semantics
Using the previously defined set of of functions, we now
formalize Ltl4−C semantics.
Definition 7 (Ltl4−C Semantics). Ltl4−C seman-
tics for properties with counting quantifiers are defined as
follows:
[u |=6 ϕ] =

> iff S(ϕ, u, 〈〉, {>}) = 1 ∧
∀v ∈ Σω : [uv |=6 ϕ] = >
⊥ iff S(ϕ, u, 〈〉,B6 − {⊥}) = 0 ∧
∀v ∈ Σω : [uv |=6 ϕ] = ⊥
>c iff S(ϕ, u, 〈〉, {>,>c}) = 1 ∧
∃v ∈ Σω : [uv |=6 ϕ] 6= >c
⊥c iff S(ϕ, u, 〈〉,B6 − {⊥,⊥c}) = 0 ∧
∃v ∈ Σω : [uv |=6 ϕ] 6= ⊥c
>p iff S(ϕ, u, 〈〉, {>,>c,>p}) = 1 ∧
S(ϕ, u, 〈〉, {>,>c}) = 0
⊥p iff S(ϕ, u, 〈〉, {>,>c,>p}) = 0 ∧
S(ϕ, u, 〈〉,B6 − {⊥,⊥c}) = 0 
Note that these semantics are applied recursively until
there is only one counting quantifier left in the formula, at
which point B checks the valuation based on Ltl4 semantics
([uDϕ |=4 ϕˆ(Dϕ)] = b). When checking the valuation of
these Ltl4 properties, B will always return an empty set in
case the input b is >c or ⊥c, since these truth values are
inapplicable to Ltl4 properties. As mentioned earlier, truth
values in B6 form a lattice. Standard lattice operators u and
unionsq are defined as expected based on the lattice’s partial order.
Permanent satisfaction (>) or violation (⊥) is applicable to
E quantifiers regardless of the comparison operator, as well
as a special case of A quantifiers:
• A quantifier. As mentioned earlier, if the A quan-
tifier is not subscripted, it is assumed to denote A=1.
In this case, a single violation in its child property in-
stances causes a permanent violation of the quantified
property.
• E quantifier. Permanent violation is possible for any
numerical constraint attached to an E quantifier, since
it is a condition on the number of satisfied property
instances.
Property 7 illustrates an example of an E quantifier that
can be permanently violated. Also, since the A quantifier
in Property 7 defaults to A=1, it will be violated if a single
user makes more than three unauthorized login attempts.
In such a case, the entire property evaluates to ⊥. Table 1
illustrates how permanent satisfaction or violation apply to
the different numerical constraints of E quantifiers.
Ax : user(x)⇒ (E≤3 r : rid(r)⇒ (login ∧ unauthorized)) (7)
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Table 1: Rules of permanent satisfaction or violation of E
constraints
Operator Verdict
> c Permanent satisfaction if > c
≥ c Permanent satisfaction if ≥ c
= c Permanent violation if > c
< c Permanent violation if ≥ c
≤ c Permanent violation if > c
To clarify the semantics, consider Property 7 and the fol-
lowing program trace:
{rid(12), user(Adam), login, unauthorized}
{rid(13), user(Adam), login, unauthorized}
{rid(14), user(Jack), login, authorized}
{rid(15), user(Adam), login, unauthorized}
{rid(16), user(Adam), login, unauthorized}
where each line represents an event: a set of interpreted
predicates. Each event contains a request identifier (rid), a
username, a request type (login), and response status
(authorized or unauthorized). As seen in the trace, there are 5
distinct value vectors: 〈Adam, 12〉, 〈Adam, 13〉, 〈Jack, 14〉,
〈Adam, 15〉, and 〈Adam, 16〉. Now, let us apply the induc-
tive semantics on the property.
Step 1. We begin by checking the truth value of [u |=6 ϕ],
which requires determining which condition in Definition 7
applies. This requires the evaluation of function S for the
different truth values shown. Since we are verifying ϕ, we
begin with the outermost counting quantifier, which is a A
quantifier. Thus, S will require calculating the cardinality
of the set P(ϕ, u,Dϕ|0), which in case of the trace should be
|{Adam, Jack}| = 2. Now, in order to evaluate S, one has
to evaluate B to determine whether each property instance
evaluates to a certain truth value or not. The two property
instances thus far are:
ϕˆ(Dϕ|1) = ϕˆ(Adam) = E≤3 r : rid(r)⇒ (login ∧ unauthorized)
ϕˆ(D′ϕ|1) = ϕˆ(Jack) = E≤3 r : rid(r)⇒ (login ∧ unauthorized)
And the trace subsequences for these property instances re-
spectively are:
uDϕ|
1
={rid(12), · · · }{rid(13), · · · }{rid(15), · · · }{rid(16), · · · }
uD
′
ϕ|1 ={rid(14), · · · }
Note that user(Adam)⇒ · · · is omitted from ϕˆ(Dϕ|1) since
user(Adam) holds according to the trace subsequence. The
same applies to user(Jack). Evaluating these property in-
stances with respect to the trace subsequences requires re-
ferring to Definition 7 again, which marks the second level
of recursion.
Step 2. Let us consider the property instance ϕˆ(Dϕ|1),
which begins with an E quantifier and has Ltl4 properties as
child instances (refer to P). These properties are in the form
of login ∧ unauthorized, where there is one instance for each
distinct request identifier. We can deduce that the property
holds for all 4 requests: 12, 13, 15, and 16, thus evaluating
to >. Therefore, the following holds:
B(ϕˆ(Dϕ|1), uDϕ|
1
, Dϕ|1,>) = 4
This value, when used in S(ϕˆ(Dϕ|1), uDϕ|1 , Dϕ|1, {>}) will
violate the numerical condition: 4 6≤ 3, resulting in S valu-
ating to 0 (false). Based on the conditions in Definition 7
and the rules of permanent violation, this property instance
becomes permanently violated and thus the verdict is ⊥.
The other property instance ϕˆ(D′ϕ|1) will however evalu-
ate to > since its child property instance
ϕˆ(D′ϕ|2) = ϕˆ(〈Jack, 14〉) = login ∧ unauthorized
is violated, and thus the number of satisfied instances is still
less than 3.
Step 3. In this step we use the valuations determined in
Step 2 to produce verdicts for the property instances in Step
1. Based on S, the A quantifier’s numerical condition is vio-
lated, since not all instances are satisfied. The final verdict
should thus be [u |=6 ϕ] = ⊥, which denotes a permanent
violation of the property.
3. DIVIDE-AND-CONQUER-BASED
MONITORING OF LTL4-C
In this section, we describe our technique inspired by
divide-and-conquer for evaluating Ltl4−C properties at run
time. This approach forms the basis of our parallel verifica-
tion algorithm in Section 4.
Unlike runtime verification of propositional Ltl4 proper-
ties, where the structure of a monitor is determined solely
based on the property itself, a monitor for an Ltl4−C needs
to evolve at run time, since the valuation of quantified vari-
ables change over time. More specifically, the monitor Mϕ
for an Ltl4−C property ϕ = Qϕψ relies on instantiating
a submonitor for each property instance ϕˆ obtained at run
time. We incorporate two type of submonitors: (1) Ltl4
submonitors evaluate the inner Ltl property ψ, and (2)
quantifier submonitors deal with quantifiers in Qϕ, described
in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2. In Subsection 3.3, we explain the
conditions under which a submonitor is instantiated at run
time. Finally, in Subsection 3.4, we elaborate on how sub-
monitors evaluate an Ltl4−C property.
3.1 LTL4 Submonitors
Let ϕ = Qϕψ be an Ltl4−C property. If |Qϕ| = 0 (respec-
tively, one wants to evaluate ϕˆ(Dϕ|i), where i = |Qϕ|), then
ϕ (respectively, ϕˆ(Dϕ|i)) is free of quantifiers and, thus, the
monitor (respectively, submonitor) of such a property is a
standard Ltl4 monitor (see Definition 6). We denote Ltl4
submonitors as M∗Dϕ , where Dϕ is the value vector with
which the monitor is initialized.
3.2 Quantifier Submonitors
Given a finite trace u and an Ltl4−C property ϕ = Qϕψ,
a quantifier submonitor (MQ) is a monitor responsible for
determining the valuation of a property instance ϕˆ(Dϕ|i)
with respect to a trace subsequence uDϕ|
i
, if i < |Qϕ|. Ob-
viously, such a valuation is in B6. Let V be a six-dimensional
vector space, where each dimension represents a truth value
in B6.
Definition 8 (Quantifier Submonitor). Let
ϕ = Qϕψ be an Ltl4−C property and ϕˆ(Dϕ|i) be a property
instance, with i ∈ [0, |Qϕ| − 1]. The quantifier submonitor
for ϕˆ(Dϕ|i) is the tuple MQDϕ|i = 〈Qi,MDϕ|i , v, b〉, where
• Qi encapsulates the quantifier information (see Equa-
tion 4)
• v ∈ V represents the current number of child property
instances that evaluate to each truth value in B6 with
respect to their trace subsequences,
• b ∈ B6 is the current value of [uDϕ|i |=6 ϕˆ(Dϕ|i)],
• MDϕ|i is the set of child submonitors (submonitors of
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child property instances) defined as follows:
MDϕ|i =
{{M∗D′ϕ | D′ϕ|i = Dϕ|i} if i = |Qϕ| − 1
{MQ
D′ϕ|i+1
| D′ϕ|i = Dϕ|i} if i < |Qϕ| − 1
Thus, if i = |Qϕ| − 1, all child submonitors are Ltl4 sub-
monitors. Otherwise, they are quantifier submonitors of the
respective child property instances. 
Based on the definition, every quantifier submonitor refer-
ences a set of child monitors. We use the following notation
to denote a hierarchy of a submonitor and its children:
MQDϕ|i
{MQDϕ|i+1 ,MQD′ϕ|i+1 ,MQD′′ϕ|i+1 , · · ·}
such that Dϕ|i = D′ϕ|i = D′′ϕ|i · · · and i < |Qϕ| − 1 which is
why the child monitors are quantifier submonitors.
3.3 Instantiating Submonitors
Let an Ltl4−C monitor Mϕ for property ϕ evaluate the
property with respect to a finite trace u = u0u1 · · · . Let
Dϕ = 〈d0, d1, · · · 〉 be a value vector and uk the first trace
event such that ∀di : pi(di) ∈ uk, where pi is the predicate
within each quantifier (i.e. Axi : pi(xi) ⇒ · · · ). In this
case, the Ltl4−C monitor instantiates submonitors for ev-
ery property instance resulting from that value vector. A
value vector of length |Qϕ| results in |Qϕ| + 1 property in-
stances: one for each quantifier in addition to an Ltl4 inner
property. The hierarchy of the instantiated submonitors is
as follows:
MQDϕ|0
{
MQDϕ|1
{
· · ·{MQ
Dϕ||Qϕ−1|{M
∗
Dϕ}
}}}
If another value vector D′ϕ is subsequently encountered
for the first time, the hierarchy of submonitors becomes as
follows:
MQDϕ|0
{
MQDϕ|1
{ · · · {M∗Dϕ}},MQD′ϕ|1{ · · · {M∗D′ϕ}}
Since the hierarchy is formulated as a recursive set, no du-
plicate submonitors are allowed. Two submonitors are du-
plicates, if they represent identical value vectors. If Dϕ|1 =
D′ϕ|1, the respective monitors are merged. Such merging is
explained in detail in Section 4.
3.4 Evaluating LTL4-C Properties
Once the Ltl4−C monitor instantiates its submonitors,
every submonitor is responsible for updating its truth value.
The truth value of Ltl4 submonitors (M∗) maps to the
current state of the submonitor’s automaton as described
in Definition 6. Quantifier submonitors update their truth
value based on the truth values of all child submonitors. The
number of child submonitors whose truth value is > is stored
in v> (i.e., the > dimension of vector v) and so on for all
truth values in B6. Then, Ltl4−C semantics are applied,
beginning with function S (see Equation 6), which in turn
relies on the cardinality of function B(ϕ, u,Dϕ|i, b) where b
is a truth value. This cardinality is readily provided by the
vector v, such that for instance B(ϕ, u,Dϕ|i,>) = v> and
so on.
Since each submonitor depends on its child submonitors,
updating truth values proceeds outwards, starting at Ltl4
submonitors, then recursively parent submonitors update
their truth values until the submonitorMQ
Dϕ|0 , which is the
root submonitor. The truth value of the root submonitor is
the truth value of property ϕ with respect to trace u. This
is visualized as the tree shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Tree structure of an Ltl4−C monitor.
4. PARALLEL ALGORITHM DESIGN
The main challenge in designing a runtime monitor is to
ensure that its behavior does not intervene with functional
and extra-functional (e.g., timing constraints) behavior of
the program under scrutiny. This section presents a parallel
algorithm for verification of Ltl4−C properties. Our idea is
that such a parallel algorithm enables us to offload the moni-
toring tasks into a different computing unit (e.g., the GPU).
The algorithm utilizes the popular MapReduce technique to
spawn and merge submonitors to determine the final verdict.
This section is organized as follows: Subsection 4.1 describes
how valuations are extracted from a trace in run time, and
Subsection 4.2 describes the steps of the algorithm in detail.
4.1 Valuation Extraction
Valuation extraction refers to obtaining a valuation of
quantified variables from the trace. As described in Ltl4−C
semantics, the predicate pi(xi) identifies the subset of the
domain of xi over which the quantifier is applied: namely
the subset that exists in the trace. From a theoretical per-
spective, we check whether the predicate is a member of
some trace event, which is a set of predicates. From an
implementation perspective, the trace event is a key-value
structure, where the key is for instance a string identifying
the quantified variable, and the value is the concrete value
of the quantified variable in that trace event. Consider the
following property:
ϕ = A≥0.95 s : socket(s)⇒ (G recv (s)⇒ F respond (s)) (8)
Predicate p in this case is socket(s), and a trace event should
contain a key socket and a value ∈ [0, 65535] representing the
socket file descriptor in the system. Thus, the valuation ex-
traction function ε(ui,K) = Dϕ returns a map where keys
are in K, and the value of each key is the value of the quan-
tified variable corresponding to this key. These keys are
defined by the user.
4.2 Algorithm Steps
Algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode of the parallel mon-
itoring algorithm. Given an Ltl4−C property ϕ = Qϕ ψ,
the input to the algorithm is the Ltl4 monitor M∗ of Ltl4
property ψ, a finite trace u, the set of quantifiers Qϕ, and
the vector of keys K used to extract valuations. Note that
the algorithm supports both online and offline runtime veri-
fication. Offline mode is straightforward since the algorithm
receives a finite trace that it can evaluate. In the case of
online mode, the algorithm maintains data structures that
represent the tree structure shown in Figure 2, and repeated
invocation of the algorithm updates these data structures
incrementally. Thus, a monitoring solution can invoke the
algorithm periodically or based on same event in an online
fashion, and still receive an evolving verdict.
The entry point to the algorithm is at Line 5 which is
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invoked when the monitor receives a trace to process. The
algorithm returns a truth value of the property at Line 8.
Subsections 4.2.1 – 4.2.4 describe the functional calls be-
tween Lines 5 – 8. The MapReduce operations are visible in
functions SortTrace and ApplyQuantifiers, which perform a
map (⇒) in Lines 10 and 51 respectively. ApplyQuantifiers
also performs a reduction () in Line 52.
4.2.1 Trace Sorting
As shown in Algorithm 1, the first step in the algorithm
is to sort the input trace u (Line 5). The function SortTrace
performs this functionality as follows:
1. The function performs a parallel map of every trace
event to the value vector that it holds using ε (Line 10).
2. The mapped trace is sorted in parallel using the quan-
tifier variable keys (Line 11). For instance, according
to Property 8, the key used for sorting will be socket,
effectively sorting the trace by socket identifier.
3. The sorted trace is then compacted based on valua-
tions, and the function returns a map µ where keys
are value vectors and values are the ranges of where
these value vectors exist in trace u (Line 12). A range
contains the start and end index. This essentially de-
fines the subsequences uDϕ for each property instance
ϕˆ(Dϕ) (refer to Subsection 2.4).
4.2.2 Monitor Spawning
Monitor spawning is the second step of the algorithm
(Line 6). The function SpawnMonitors receives a map µ
and searches the cached collection of previously encountered
value vectors D for duplicates. If a value vector in µ is new,
it creates submonitors and inserts them in the tree of sub-
monitors T (Line 19). The function AddToTree attempts to
generate |Qϕ| − 1 quantifier submonitors MQ (Line 26) en-
suring there are no duplicate monitors in the tree (Line 27).
After all quantifier submonitors are created, SpawnMonitors
creates an Ltl4 submonitorM∗ and adds it as a child to the
leaf quantifier submonitor in the tree representing the value
vector (Line 20). This resembles the structure in Figure 2.
Creation of submonitors is performed in parallel for all value
vectors in trace u.
4.2.3 Distributing the Trace
The next step in the algorithm is to distribute the sorted
trace to all Ltl4 submonitors (Line 7). The function Dis-
tribute instructs every Ltl4 submonitor to process its re-
spective trace by passing the full trace and the range of
its respective subsequence, which is provided by the map µ
(Line 42). The Ltl4 monitor updates its state according to
the trace subsequence and stores its truth value b.
4.2.4 Applying Quantifiers
Applying quantifiers is a recursive process, beginning with
the leaf quantifier submonitors and proceeding upwards to-
wards the root of the tree (Line 8). Function ApplyQuanti-
fiers operates in the following steps:
1. The function retrieves all quantifier submonitors at the
ith level in the tree T (Line 50).
2. In parallel, for each quantifier submonitor, all child
submonitor truth values are reduced into a single truth
value of that quantifier submonitor (Lines 51-53). This
step essentially reduces all child truth vectors into a
single vector and then applies Ltl4−C semantics to
determine the truth value of the current submonitor.
3. The function proceeds recursively calling itself on sub-
monitors that are one level higher. It terminates when
the root of the tree is reached, where the truth value
is the final verdict of the property with respect to the
trace.
Algorithm 1 Ltl4−C monitoring algorithm
1: INPUT: An Ltl4 monitorM∗ of Ltl property ψ, a finite trace u, a
set of quantifiers Qϕ, and a vector of keys K to extract valuations
of quantified variables.
2: declare T = {MQ
D|0} . Tree of quantifier submonitors
3: declare D = {} . Value vector set
4: declare M∗ = {} . Ltl4 submonitor set
5: µ← SortTrace(u) . The entry point
6: SpawnMonitors(µ)
7: Distribute(u,µ)
8: return ApplyQuantifiers(|Qϕ − 1|)
9: function SortTrace(u) . Trace sorting and compaction
10: ui ⇒ u′i := ε(ui, K) . ‖ map to value vectors
11: ParallelSort(u′,K)
12: µ〈D, r〉 ← ParallelCompact(u′)
13: return µ
14: end function
15: function SpawnMonitors(µ) . Monitor spawning
16: for D ∈ µ do in parallel
17: if D 6∈ D then
18: Add(D,D)
19: t← AddToTree(D)
20: t.addMonitor(CreateMonitor(D))
21: end if
22: end for
23: end function
24: function AddToTree(D)
25: t = T .root
26: for i ∈ [1, |Qϕ| − 1] do
27: if MQ
D|i 6∈ t.children then
28: t.addchild(MQ
D|i )
29: end if
30: t← t.children
[
MQ
D|i
]
31: end for
32: return t
33: end function
34: function CreateMonitor(D) . Monitor creation
35: M∗D ← LaunchMonitorThread(D)
36: M∗D.D ← D
37: add(M∗,M∗D)
38: return M∗D
39: end function
40: function Distribute(u,µ) . Distribute trace to monitors
41: forM∗D ∈ M∗ do in parallel
42: ProcessBuffer(M∗D,u,µ[M∗D.D])
43: end for
44: end function
45: function ProcessBuffer(M∗D,u,r) . Process trace subsequence
46: filter include u⇒ u′ := u[r.start, r.end] . ‖ filter
47: M∗D.b ←UpdateMonitor(M∗D, u′)
48: end function
49: function ApplyQuantifiers(i) . Apply quantifiers
50: for t ∈ T.nodesAtDepth(i) do in parallel
51: t.children ⇒ {s := [v, v′, · · · ]} . ‖ map to truth vectors
52: s t.v . ‖ reduction to truth vector
53: t.b← Valuation(t) . Ltl4−C semantics
54: end for
55: if i = 0 then
56: return t.b
57: end if
58: return ApplyQuantifiers(i− 1)
59: end function
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented Algorithm 1 for two computing
technologies: Multi-core CPUs and GPUs. We applied three
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optimizations in our GPU-based implementation: (1) we
use CUDA Thrust API to implement parallel sort, (2) we
using Zero-Copy Memory which parallelizes data transfer
with kernel operation without caching, and (3) we enforced
alignment, which enables coalesced read of trace events into
monitor instances. In order to intercept systems calls, we
have integrated our algorithm with the Linux strace ap-
plication, which logs all system calls made by a process, in-
cluding the parameters passed, the return value, the time the
call was made, etc. Notice that using strace has the ben-
efit of eliminating static analysis for instrumentation. The
work in [7, 17, 18] also use strace to debug the behavior of
applications.
Subsection 5.1 presents the case studies implemented to
study the effectiveness of the GPU implementation in online
and offline monitoring. Subsection 5.2 discusses the experi-
mental setup, while Subsection 5.3 analyzes the results.
5.1 Case studies
We have conducted the following three case studies:
1. Ensuring every request on a socket is responded
to. This case study monitors the responsiveness of a
web server. Web servers under heavy load may expe-
rience some timeouts, which results in requests that
are not responded to. This is a factor contributing
to the uptime of the server, along with other factors
like power failure, or system failure. Thus, we monitor
that at least 95% of requests are indeed responded:
A≥0.95 s : socket(s)G receive (s)⇒ F respond (s)
We utilize the Apache Benchmarking tool to generate
different load levels on the Apache Web Server.
2. Ensuring fairness in utilization of personal cloud
storage services. This case study is based on the
work in [10], which discusses how profiling DropBox
traffic can identify the bottlenecks and improve the
performance. Among the issues detected during this
analysis, is a user repeatedly uploading chunks of max-
imum size to DropBox servers. Thus, it is beneficial
for a runtime verification system to ensure that the
average chunk size of all clients falls below a prede-
fined maximum threshold, effectively ensuring fairness
of service use. The corresponding Ltl4−C property is
as follows:
Au : user(u)⇒ F (avg chunksize (u) ≤ maximum)
where avg chunksize is a predicate that is based on a
variable in the program representing the average chunk
size of the current user’s session.
3. Ensuring proxy cache is functioning correctly.
This experiment is based on a study that shows the ef-
fectiveness of utilizing proxy cache in decreasing
YouTube videos requests in a large university cam-
pus [19]. Thus, we monitor that no video is requested
externally while existing in the cache:
Av : vid(v)⇒ E=0 r : req(r)⇒ (cached(v) ∧ external(r))
5.2 Experimental Setup
Experiment Hardware and Software. The machine we
use to run experiments comprises of a 12-core Intel Xeon E5-
1650 CPU, an Nvidia Tesla K20c GPU, and 32GB of RAM,
running Ubuntu 12.04.
Experimental Factors. The experiments involve compar-
ing the following factors:
• Implementation. We compare three implementations
of the Ltl4−C monitoring algorithm:
– Single Core CPU. A CPU implementation run-
ning on a single core. The justification for using
a single core is to allow the remaining cores to per-
form the main functionality of the system without
causing contention from the monitoring process.
– Parallel CPU. A CPU implementation running on
all 12 cores of the system. The implementation
uses OpenMP.
– GPU. A parallel GPU-based implementation.
• Trace size. We also experiment with different trace
sizes to study the scalability of the monitoring solution,
increasing exponentially from 16, 384 to 8, 388, 608.
Experimental Metrics. Each experiment results in values
for the following metrics:
• Total execution time. The total execution time of the
monitor.
• Monitor CPU utilization. The CPU utilization of the
monitor process.
In addition, we measure the following metrics for Case Study
1, since it utilizes an online monitor:
• Monitored program CPU utilization. The CPU utiliza-
tion of the monitored program. This is to demonstrate
the impact of monitoring on overall CPU utilization.
• strace parsing CPU utilization. The CPU utilization
of the strace parsing module. This module translates
strace strings a numerical table.
We perform 20 replicates of each experiment and present
error bars of a 95% confidence interval.
5.3 Results
The results of Case Study 1 are shown in Figure 3. As
seen in the figure, the GPU implementation scales efficiently
with increasing trace size, resulting in the lowest monitoring
time of all three implementations. The GPU versus single
core CPU speedup ranges from 0.8 to 1.6, increasing with
the increasing trace size. When compared to parallel CPU
(CPU ||), the speedup ranges from 0.78 to 1.59. This indi-
cates that parallel CPU outperforms GPU for smaller traces
(32768), yet does not scale as well as GPU in this case study.
This is attributed to the low number of individual objects
in the trace, making parallelism less impactful. CPU uti-
lization results in Figure 3 show a common trend with the
increase of trace size. When the trace size is small, paral-
lel implementations incur high CPU utilization as opposed
to a single core implementation, which could be attributed
to the overhead of parallelization relative to the small trace
size. On the other hand, GPU shows a stable utilization
percentage, with a 78% average utilization. The single core
CPU implementation shows a similar trend, yet slightly ele-
vated average utilization (average 86%). The parallel CPU
implementation imposes a higher CPU utilization (average
1.15%), since more cores are being used to process the trace.
This result indicates that shipping the monitoring workload
to GPU consistently provides more time for CPU to exe-
cute other processes including the monitored process. The
results of Case Study 2 and Case Study 3 in Figures 4 and 5
respectively provide a different perspective. The number of
individual objects in these traces are large, making paral-
lelism highly effective. For Case Study 2, the speedup of
the GPU implementation over single core CPU ranges from
1.8 to 3.6, and 0.83 to 1.18 over parallel CPU. The aver-
age CPU utilization of GPU, single core CPU, and parallel
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Figure 4: Results of Case Study 2.
CPU is 64%, 82%, and 598% respectively. For Case Study
3, speedup is more significant, with 6.3 average speedup of
GPU over single core CPU, and 1.75 over parallel CPU.
The average CPU utilization of GPU, single core CPU, and
parallel CPU is 73%, 95%, and 680% respectively. Thus,
the parallel CPU implementation is showing large speedup
similar to the GPU implementation, yet also results in a
commensurate CPU utilization percentage, since most cores
of the system are fully utilized.
Although the parallel CPU implementation provides
reasonable speedup, and the single-core CPU imple-
mentation imposes low CPU utilization overhead, the
GPU implementation manages to achieve both simul-
taneously.
6. RELATED WORK
Runtime verification of parametric properties has been
studied by Rosu et al [11, 12, 15]. In this line of work, it
is possible to build a runtime monitor parameterized by ob-
jects in a Java program. The work by Chen and Rosu [8]
presents a method of monitoring parametric properties in
which a trace is divided into slices, such that each monitor
operates on its slice. This resembles our method of iden-
tifying trace subsequences and how they are processed by
submonitors. However, parametric monitoring does not pro-
vide a formalization of applying existential and numerically
constrained quantifiers over objects.
Bauer et al. [5] present a formalization of a variant of first
order logic combined with LTL. This work is related to our
work in that it instantiates monitors at run time according
to valuations, and defines quantification over a finite subset
of the quantified domain, normally with that subset being
defined by the trace. Our work extends this notion with
numerical constraints over quantifiers, as well as a parallel
algorithm for monitoring such properties.
The work by Leucker et al. presents a generic approach
for monitoring modulo theories [9]. This work provides a
more expressive specification language. Our work enforces
a canonical syntax which is not required in [9], resulting in
more expressiveness. However, the monitoring solution pro-
vided requires SMT solving at run time. This may induce
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Figure 5: Results of Case Study 3.
substantial overhead as opposed to the lightweight parallel
algorithm presented in this paper, especially since it is de-
signed to allow offloading the workload on GPU. SMT solv-
ing also runs the risk of undecidability, which is not clear
whether it is accounted for or not. Ltl4−C is based on six-
valued semantics, extending Ltl4 by two truth values: >c
and ⊥c. These truth values are added to support quantifiers
and their numerical constraints. This six-valued semantics
provides a more accurate assessment of the satisfaction of
the property based on finite traces as opposed to the three-
valued semantics in [9]. Finally, although Ltl4−C does not
support the expressiveness of full first-order logic, numerical
constraints add a flavor of second-order logic increasing its
expressiveness in the domain of properties where some per-
centage or count of satisfied instances needs to be enforced.
The work in [1] presents a method of using MapReduce
to evaluate LTL properties. The algorithm is capable of
processing arbitrary fragments of the trace in parallel. Sim-
ilarly, the work in [2] presents a MapReduce method for
offline verification of LTL properties with first-order quanti-
fiers. Our work uses a similar approach in leveraging MapRe-
duce, yet also adds the expressiveness of counting semantics
with numerical constraints. Also, our approach supports
both offline and online monitoring by introducing six-valued
semantics, which are capable of reasoning about the satis-
faction of a partial trace. This is unclear in [2], since there
is no evidence of supporting online monitoring.
Finally, the work in [6] presents two parallel algorithms for
verification of propositional Ltl specifications at run time.
These algorithms are implemented in the tool RiTHM [16].
This paper enhances the framework in [6,16] by introducing
a significantly more expressive formal specification language
along with a parallel runtime verification system.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a specification language
(Ltl4−C) for runtime verification of properties of types of
objects in software and networked systems. Our language
is an extension of Ltl that adds counting semantics with
numerical constraints. The six truth values of the seman-
tics of Ltl4−C allows system designers to obtain informa-
tive verdicts about the status of system properties at run
time. We also introduced an efficient and effective paral-
lel algorithm with two implementations on multi-core CPU
and GPU technologies. The results of our experiments on
three real-world case studies show that runtime monitoring
using GPU provides us with the best throughput and CPU
utilization, resulting in minimal intervention in the normal
operation of the system under inspection.
For future work, we are planning to design a framework for
monitoring Ltl4−C properties in distributed systems and
cloud services. Another direction is to extend Ltl4−C such
that it allows non-canonical strings of quantifiers. Finally,
we are currently integrating Ltl4−C in our tool RiTHM [16].
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